Worlds within Worlds: a Dilemma for  Modal Realism by Smith, Subrena E.
2019 / 2020 AUSLEGUNG, VOLUME 33
22Worlds within Worlds:  
a Dilemma for Modal Realism
In this paper I will present an argument that David Lewis’ modal 
realism is self-refuting, and that the contradiction that makes it 
self-refuting can only be blocked by modifying certain other of 
Lewis’ philosophical commitments. My argument will proceed 
as follows. First, I will briefly describe the motivation for and 
the main components of Lewisian modal realism. Second, I will 
explain Lewis’ view of what it is for an individual or a set to exist 
in a world. Third, I go on to argue that Lewis’ position creates a 
dilemma for modal realism: either each world contains all the 
other worlds as parts, which violates the principle that worlds 
are spatiotemporally isolated, or worlds are reducible to sets, 
which violates the principle that worlds are individuals. Finally, 
I briefly discuss a suggestion by Divers that strongly bears on 
this problem.
Modal Realism
I begin with a summary description of modal realism. Modal 
realism is motivated by the broadly Quinean view that 
quantifying over possibilia provides us with the best way of 
making sense of modal claims, a position that Lewis (1986a) 
defends in considerable detail as “a philosopher’s paradise.” 
Lewis identifies possibilia with worlds. Worlds are concrete 
(“a big physical object” [Lewis, 1986b: 1]) and non-overlapping. 
They are non-overlapping because they are spatiotemporally, 
and therefore causally, segregated from one another. Items are 
spatiotemporally or causally related to one another just in case 
they are parts of the same world, and no two worlds share any 
parts. As Lewis says, “Worlds are spatiotemporally and causally 
isolated from one another; else they would not be whole worlds 
but parts of a greater world” (1986a: 84). So, the principle that 
worlds are spatiotemporally isolated entails that no world can be 
part of any other world. There is an infinite plurality of worlds, 
because every possibility — every way the world could be or could 
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have been — corresponds to the facts that obtain at some world. 
No constituent of a world can exist at more than one world, on 
pain of violating Leibniz’ Law. So, talk of transworld individuals 
must be understood in terms of constituents of worlds and their 
counterparts at other worlds (where counterparts are understood 
as other-worldly constituents that are similar to them).
Modal realism allows one to translate modal talk into a non-
modal idiom of possible worlds which, Lewis claims, should be 
understood realistically. A claim is possibly true iff it is true 
of some world, necessarily true iff it is true of all worlds, not 
possibly true iff it is true of no world, and contingently true iff 
it is not true of some worlds. With suitable modifications (which 
need not concern us here) the modal realist framework can also 
be used to give an analysis of de re modality. The concept of 
actuality is understood indexically. The actual world is just the 
world to which one belongs, and all worlds are therefore actual 
from the standpoint of their inhabitants.
 
Two Ways of Being in a World
To understand the modal realist view of what it is to exist in or 
“inhabit” a world, it is helpful to consider Lewis’ basic ontolog-
ical commitments. Worlds are composed of simple particulars. 
They are aggregates of Humean spacetime points instantiating 
“perfectly natural” properties, upon which other things in that 
world supervene. As he puts the point, “all there is to the world 
is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little 
thing and then another” (1986b: xi). The only non-individuals 
admitted into the Lewisian ontology are sets. Other non-indi-
viduals, such as properties, numbers, propositions, and events 
are reducible to sets, so if one quantifies over these sorts of en-
tities, as Lewis does, then one must, on Quinean grounds, admit 
them into one’s ontology. Lewis states that individuals exist in 
or “inhabit” worlds if they are parts of those worlds. 
A world is a large possible individual; it has smaller possible 
individuals as parts. A galaxy, a planet, a man, an electron —
these things inhabit their world simply by being parts of it. 
Just as the electron is part of the man, and the man in turn 
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is part of his planet which is part of its galaxy, so the galaxy 
in turn is part of its world. And so are its parts, and their 
parts,… since the relation of part to whole is transitive. Any 
possible individual is part of a world, and in that sense it is 
in a world. (As a special case a world is an improper part of 
itself). Worlds do not overlap; unlike Siamese twins, they 
have no shared parts. Thus…no possible individual is part of 
two worlds (1983b: 39).
But he also states that there are two other ways that we can 
think of entities being in a world. One concerns mereological 
sums of individuals existing in different worlds. Lewis (1983b: 
40) describes these as impossible individuals and they need 
not concern us here. Finally, there is the way that sets are “in” 
worlds. Because “the whole-part relation applies to individuals 
and not sets…no set is in any world in the sense of being part of 
it” (Ibid.). Rather than thinking of sets as in worlds in virtue of 
being parts of worlds, Lewis proposes that we think of them as 
items that “exist alike from the standpoint of all worlds, just as 
they have no location in time and space but exist alike from the 
standpoint of all times and places” (Lewis 1983b: 39). Because 
we quantify over numbers, properties, etc. when we evaluate 
the truth of sentences whose domains are restricted to a single 
world, we can say that numbers, properties, etc., are “in” worlds 
only because they exist from the standpoint of those worlds.
In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis recasts the individual/set 
distinction as the concrete/abstract distinction. After initially 
stating that he is unsure about the basis for the distinction 
between abstractness and concreteness, he turns to what he 
describes as four conventional interpretations of the distinction, 
using each of them to arrive at a judgment about the meta-
physical status of worlds. According to what he calls the way 
of example, some items, for instance “donkeys and puddles, 
protons and stars” (Lewis, 1986: 82) are paradigmatically 
concrete. “I am inclined to say,” he writes, “that…a world 
is concrete rather than abstract—more donkey-like than 
number-like” (Lewis, 1986: 83). The way of conflation equates 
the abstract/concrete distinction to the universal/particular 
distinction or the set/member distinction. Lewis’ verdict is 
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“that worlds are individuals not sets” so therefore “worlds are 
concrete” (Ibid.). 
In terms of the negative way, abstract items have no 
spatiotemporal location, do not enter into causal relations, and 
are never indiscernible from one another, unlike concrete items. 
The key point in Lewis’ detailed discussion of the negative way is 
that “whole worlds …cannot stand in spatiotemporal and causal 
relation to anything outside themselves” but they “can inherit 
concreteness from their parts” and so “worlds and their parts…
are concrete” (Lewis, 1986: 85). Finally, the way of abstraction 
has it that abstract entities are abstractions from concrete 
entities. Lewis asserts that “worlds are concrete” as “they lack 
no specificity, and there is nothing for them to be abstractions 
from” (Lewis, 1986: 86). He concludes, “So, by and large,… 
it seems that indeed I should say that worlds as I take them to be 
are concrete; and so are many of their parts, but perhaps not all.”
The phrase “but perhaps not all” might seem puzzling. It 
might be taken to mean that Lewis is entertaining the possibility 
that sets can be parts of worlds, but the context makes it clear 
that he is referring to the possibility that there are non-individual 
non-sets (“if universals and tropes are non-spatiotemporal parts 
of ordinary particulars that in turn are parts of worlds, then 
here we have abstractions that are parts of worlds” [86]).1
A dilemma for modal realism
It is not clear that the notion of something existing from the 
standpoint of a world can be reasonably construed as a notion 
of that thing being in that world without being part of it. But 
let us suppose that Lewis’ explanatory strategy is satisfactory. 
In that case, every possible individual exists only as part of a 
world, and every set exists only from the standpoint of worlds, 
thus not allowing that individuals exist in worlds in virtue of 
existing from the standpoint of them or that sets are in worlds 
in virtue of being parts of them.2 
01   See also note 2 in his 
Postscripts to ‘Counterpart theory 
and quantified modal logic,’ 
(1883b: 40) He writes, “I am not 
sure what to say about universals, 
as advocated in D. M. Armstrong…
except for this: they are not to be 
confused with the sets of individuals 
that I call properties. If there are 
universals, they differ in many ways 
from properties and they meet 
completely different theoretical 
needs.”
02   “Even a sequence of possible 
individuals all from the same world 
is not, strictly speaking, itself in that 
world” (Lewis, 1983b: 40).
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In this section, I will argue that the claim that modal realism 
is true entails a contradiction. If modal realism is true, then there 
exists an infinite plurality of worlds. Given that the modal realist 
framework has it that truthmakers for modal claims are facts 
that obtain in worlds (“in” in either of the two senses specified 
by Lewis), it follows that the truth of modal realism itself must 
rest on facts that obtain in worlds. As I have explained above, 
Lewis accepts two interpretations of what it is for something 
to be “in” a world. Concrete objects are in worlds iff they are 
parts of worlds and abstract objects are in worlds iff they are 
accessible from the standpoint of worlds. But neither of these is 
adequate for the truth of the claim that there are possible worlds. 
If the claim that modal realism is made true by worlds having 
a plurality of worlds as their parts, this violates the principle 
that worlds are spatiotemporally isolated. And if modal realism 
is made true by a plurality of worlds existing from the standpoint 
of some world, this violates the principle that worlds are concrete. 
The argument proceeds as follows.
1.   Modal realism is possibly true.3
2.  A claim is made possibly true by what obtains at 
some world.
3.  If modal realism is true, then there is an infinite 
 plurality of worlds.
4.  Worlds are concrete individuals, not sets.
5.  Each world is spatiotemporally isolated from the 
others. 
These first five premises are uncontroversially core 
commitments of the modal realist framework. I now want to 
argue that their conjunction entails a contradiction.
6.  If possibly modal realism is true, then there is an 
infinite plurality of worlds in some world.
(6) is entailed by premises 1 through 3. It might be interpreted 
in two different ways. It might be a claim to the effect that an 
infinite plurality of worlds exists from the standpoint of some 
03   I have chosen to use the 
weaker claim that modal realism  
is possibly true rather than the 
stronger one that modal realism is 
necessarily true, which is perhaps 
more consistent with what modal 
realists assert. After all, if modal 
realism is only possibly but not  
necessarily true, there are some 
worlds at which it is false. If my  
argument goes through for the 
weaker claim it will, a fortiori, go 
through for the stronger one. 
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world. Or it might be interpreted as the claim that an infinite 
plurality of worlds is part of some world (that is, that each of 
these worlds is part of that world). So:
7.   If modal realism is true, an infinite plurality of 
worlds is either part of some world or exists from the 
standpoint of some world.
If we interpret (6) as the first disjunct of (7), this contradicts 
(5). But as (5) is an indispensable component of the modal realist 
account of worlds, this interpretation is untenable. So:
8.  It is not the case that an infinite plurality of worlds 
exists as part of some world.
This leaves us with the second disjunct:
9.  There exists an infinite plurality of worlds from the 
standpoint of some world.
For (9) to be true, it must be the case that it is the infinite set 
of worlds, rather than the worlds themselves, that exists from 
the standpoint of some world. Put somewhat differently, for 
(9) to be true, it must be the case that the infinite plurality of 
worlds is an abstract object. However, although the set of worlds 
is, if anything, an abstract object, the worlds themselves are 
concrete individuals. In saying that modal realism is possibly 
true, the modal realist is saying something about the existence 
of concrete individuals (worlds) rather than saying something 
about a set. Consider the actual world w and just one possible 
world w*. Suppose that w* is in w in virtue of existing from the 
standpoint of w. This would require that w* is an abstract object 
rather than a concrete individual which, according to Lewis, it 
must be. 
So, given (5) it follows that:
10. It is not the case that an infinite plurality of worlds 
exists from the standpoint of some world.
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But if that is the case, then, given (8) we must conclude that:
11. The infinite plurality of worlds is not in any world, 
and therefore:
12. Modal realism is false.
Addressing the problem
Divers (2002, also 1999) recognizes that Lewisian modal 
realism has difficulty giving an intelligible analysis of modal 
claims that are not restricted to worlds. He distinguishes 
between what he calls “ordinary” modal claims and what he 
calls “extraordinary” ones. Ordinary modal claims, such as 
“Possibly, pigs fly” are world-restricted claims. They are true 
just in case the possible item — in this case, flying pigs — are 
parts of some world. Extraordinary modal claims, such as “It 
is possible that there is a plurality of worlds” are not world-
restricted, and must be treated differently than ordinary claims, 
because if they are treated in that fashion one must say that 
worlds are parts of other worlds. 
Clearly, modal claims about modal realism need to be treated 
differently than other, more ordinary, modal claims. I have 
argued above that modal realism does not have the resources to 
do this, thus giving rise to the dilemma. Because Divers regards 
Lewis’ explanation that abstracta are “in” worlds by existing 
from their standpoint as “at least ad hoc, worryingly vague, and 
perhaps even so improperly explicated as to merit classification 
as a primitive” (Divers, 2002: 89), he does not conceive of the 
problem as a dilemma. He proposes that sentences such as “It is 
possible that A iff A” and “It is possible that there is a plurality 
of worlds” should be considered as extraordinary modal claims. 
“It is possible that there is a plurality of worlds” should be 
expressed as something like the assertion that there are at least 
two non-identical worlds ( ЕxЕy [Wx ^ Wy ^ ¬(y = x)]). Hence, 
he suggests, the modal realist “appeals to the extraordinary 
interpretation of modal claims whenever she intends or 
interprets the associated non-modal content as content that is 
not world-restricted content” (2002: 50).   
This is a significant departure from modal realism as Lewis 
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envisioned it, as it does not accord with Lewis’ insistence that 
modal claims are made true by what is in all, some, or no 
worlds. It is not clear to me whether this solution is preferable 
to others, such as simply allowing that individuals can be in 
worlds in the same way that sets can be in worlds or exchanging 
modal realism for one or another ersatz version of possible 
world theory. But whatever the solution, it seems clear that some 
departure from Lewisian modal realism is required.
Conclusion
Lewis argued that modal realism is justified insofar as it 
provides the best account of the truth of modal statements. So, 
an orthodox modal realist — that is, one who adheres to modal 
realism just as Lewis articulated it — might say that we should 
assume the truth of modal realism in spite of the problem that 
I have elucidated because it still provides the best account of 
the truth of modal statements. Maybe yes, maybe no. Lewis 
did not regard the correctness of modal realism as a foregone 
conclusion. Although he argued that modal realism succeeds 
better than any of its alternatives, he also conceded that: 
Maybe the theoretical benefits to be gained are illusory, 
because the analyses that use possibilia do not succeed on 
their own terms. Maybe the price is higher than it seems, 
because model realism has unacceptable hidden implications. 
Maybe the price is not right; even if I am right about what 
theoretical benefits can be had for what ontological cost, 
maybe the very idea of accepting controversial ontology for 
the sake of theoretical benefits is misguided. Maybe — and this 
is the doubt that most interests me — the benefits are not worth 
the cost, because they can be had more cheaply elsewhere 
(Lewis 1986a: 4-5). 
There is not yet, and perhaps will never be, philosophical 
consensus on whether the benefits of modal realism outweigh 
its costs. If my analysis in this paper is anywhere near correct, 
any such cost/benefit analysis needs to consider the dilemma 
that I describe.
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